



Department of Energy
Washington, DC 20585

November 25, 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION

FROM:



MARK B. WHITAKER, JR.
DEPARTMENTAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE
DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD
OFFICE OF HEALTH, SAFETY AND SECURITY

SUBJECT:

Facility Representative Program Performance Indicators Quarterly
Report, July – September (3rd Quarter CY2008)

Attached is the Facility Representative (FR) Program Performance Indicators Quarterly Report covering the period from July to September 2008. Data for these indicators are gathered by Field elements quarterly per Department of Energy (DOE)-STD-1063-2006, *Facility Representatives*, and reported to Headquarters program offices for evaluation and feedback to improve the FR Program. A summary of this quarter's data concluded:

80% Fully Qualified (last Quarter was 87%)
89% Staffing Level (last Quarter was 86%)
45% Time Spent in the Field (DOE goal is > 40%)
76% Time Spent in Oversight Activities (DOE Goal is > 65%)

Percentages are based on FR staffing analyses at 205 Full Time Equivalents (FTEs) and 183 FTEs actual staffing. Fully qualified FR totals for this period broken down by program were as follows: Environmental Management (EM) had 81% fully qualified, Nuclear Energy (NE) had 100% fully qualified, National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) had 73% fully qualified, and Science (SC) had 85% fully qualified. The DOE goal for fully qualified FRs is greater than 80%.

FR Staffing for EM increased from 78% (last reporting quarter) to 87%, as FR vacancies were filled at the Savannah River Operations Office, Office of River Protection, Oak Ridge Office, and West Valley Demonstration Project. FR staffing was at 90% for NNSA, 100% for NE, and 85% for SC. The DOE goal for FR staffing is 100%. Recruiting activities continue for the remaining vacancies.

FR attrition for this period was ten, with five coming from NNSA, four from EM, and one from SC. NNSA attrition included two Los Alamos Site Office FR transfers to other DOE locations, one Savannah River Site Office FR promotion to an Assistant Manager position, and single FRs at the Sandia Site Office and Y-12 Site Office transferring to lateral positions within their respective sites. EM attrition included two Office of River Protection FR promotions, one Richland Operations Office FR promotion, and one Richland Operations



Office FR transfer. One FR at the Argonne Site Office received a promotion making the SC FR attrition one during this reporting period. There was no NE FR attrition during this reporting period.

Current FR information and past quarterly performance indicator reports are accessible at the FR web site at <https://www.hss.energy.gov/deprep/facrep/>. Should you have any questions or comments on this report, please contact me or the DOE Facility Representative Program Manager, James Heffner at 202-586-3690.

Attachment

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Facility Representative Program Performance Indicators (3QCY2008)

<u>Field or Ops Office</u>	<u>Staffing Analysis</u>	<u>FTEs</u>	<u>Actual Staffing</u>	<u>% Staffing</u>	<u>Attrition</u>	<u>% Core Qualified</u>	<u>% Fully Qualified</u>	<u>% Field Time *</u>	<u>% Oversight Time **</u>
ID (EM)	13	12	11	85	0	91	91	47	87
OR (EM)	19	18	18	95	0	72	72	47	67
ORP	14	15	12	86	2	83	83	45	84
PPPO	5	5	5	100	0	80	80	41	70
RL	19	17	17	89	2	100	100	46	71
SR	32	32	25	78	0	72	72	49	81
WVDP	2	2	2	100	0	50	50	36	70
EM Totals	104	101	90	87	4	81	81	47	77
DOE GOALS	-	-	-	100	-	-	>80	>40	>65

* % Field Time is defined as the number of hours spent in the plant/field divided by the number of available work hours in the quarter. The number of available work hours is the actual number of hours a Facility Representative works in a calendar quarter, including overtime hours. It does not include leave time (sick, annual, or other) or holidays, nor does it include special assignments greater than 1 week assigned by the Field Element Manager.

** % Oversight Time includes % Field Time

EM Facility Representative (FR) Highlights:

- ID (EM): A Facility and Material Disposition Project (FMDP) FR issued a Concern after noting that the contractor had failed to adequately identify root causes, implement appropriate corrective actions to prevent recurrence, or validate that corrective actions performed were effectively implemented to accomplish their intended purpose for January 2007 and June 2007 DOE-ID identified issues regarding non-compliant temporary power installations. This failure resulted in a recurrence for deficient temporary power configurations at his assigned facility.
- ID (EM): An FMDP FR served as the DOE-ID Line Management Assessment (LMA) Team Leader for a readiness review of the contractor to proceed with concurrent fuel handling operations in the CPP-666 Fuel Storage Area (FSA) due to significant changes in the operations and to the authorization basis. The team concluded an adequate level of readiness had been achieved.
- ID (EM): A Waste Disposition Project (WDP) FR observed a contractor rigger attempting to operate a gantry crane that he was not qualified to operate and had not read the manufacturer's operation manual as required.
- ID (EM): During a monitor watch, a WDP FR observed fire protection personnel in the process of installing a new audio amplifier panel. Through the review of the work documentation, the FR noted the flash hazard analysis was for an adjacent panel and not the amplifier panel being replaced.
- ID (EM): During operational oversight, a WDP FR determined the contractor has not provided adequate safety oversight of a construction subcontractor. The lack of safety oversight by the contractor resulted in a number of hoisting and rigging practices contrary to DOE-STD- 1090 and the manufacturer's instructions.
- OR (EM): FR notable statistics during this quarter included the execution of 182 walkthroughs and/or assessments; the review in excess of 719 contractor documents; and the attendance in excess of 731 meetings, briefings, Plan of the Days (PODs), and Plan of the Weeks (POWs) in support of contractor activities.
- OR (EM): On August 5, work continued emplacing the K-1401 slab into the basement. At K-1020 the slab has been busted up and is being disposed of at the Y-12 land fill. The work removing the universal waste at K-1035 has been completed and the crew is demobilizing from the site. RSI continues their surveying of the K-770 area. While performing this survey and employee became ill and exited the area. At this point the PSS was notified and the Oak Ridge Fire Department responded. The employee was conscious and was transported to Methodist Medical Center in Oak Ridge. The employee was treated and it was determined that the cause of the illness was a viral infection. A critique was held with RSI on the incident and it was reemphasized to the employees that they should inform their

supervisors if they are not feeling well prior to starting work. In this case it was noted that the employee had not been feeling sickly prior to starting work.

- OR (EM): The FR Program added an additional FRs increasing the the staffing level to 100% of the FTE positions approved by the Site.
- OR (EM): The New Mexico Environmental Department and the Environmental Protection Agency audits of remote-handled (RH) transuranic (TRU) processing and characterization were completed on July 2. The audit went very well with only a few observations. The TRU Waste Processing Center (TWPC) continued contact-handled (CH) and RH TRU operations. Master-slave manipulator repairs were completed. TWPC CH TRU waste processing related activities continued in both the Glovebox and the Box Breakdown Area. Central Characterization Project (CCP) performed non-destructive examination and non-destructive assay of CH TRU waste drums. CCP continued preparation of the acceptable knowledge waste stream summary reports for CH and RH TRU waste. The REDC (Radiochemical Engineering Development Center) and NFS (Nuclear Fuel Services) NDA (non-destructive assay) letters were approved. The Department of Energy Oak Ridge Office, TWPC, CCP, and Bechtel Jacobs Company LLC (BJC) representatives continued to meet to work interfaces regarding CH TRU and RH TRU waste transfers and other project topics. BJC continued to vent and sample drums of CH TRU waste. Deliveries of waste by BJC to TWPC continued.
- OR (EM): Walked down TSCAI with DOE Program Manager on August 8 to observe maintenance mechanics repair the ash conveyor. Incinerator was off waste due to work being performed on the ash conveyor chain which had come off the sprocket during manual deslagging the previous day. Two totes of liquid waste were received from K-25IK27 building. One observation was identified during walkthrough. Ladders were observed lying on top of the currently use purge to surge sump hose. This deficiency was discussed with facility manager and it had been corrected.
- ORP: A finding was identified with the contractor's practices regarding Potential Inadequacy in the Safety Analyses (PISAs) and timeliness of Unreviewed Safety Questions (USQs). Corrective actions are ongoing.
- ORP: An FR determined the current Bechtel National, Inc. (BNI) Hazardous Communication Program (HAZCOM) was complete, functional, and applicable to the work being performed.
- ORP: An FR identified several major issues related to the training, procedures and conduct of operations (CONOPS) at the Pretreatment Effluent Facility. As a result, the facility is instituting changes to their project that address the deficiencies prior to introducing hazmat into the plant.
- ORP: An FR identified that a pre-job walkdown was not done for a valve positioning job resulting in work inefficiency. The purpose of the requirement deals with surety of Safety Significant valve positioning which is safety related. The contractor has reemphasized the importance of these walkdowns.
- ORP: An FR identified that the process for applying lessons learned into a work package after an abnormal radiological event was less than adequate. The contractor is implementing changes to procedures that alter, approve, and control work after a work stoppage for an abnormal radiological event.
- ORP: An FR identified three examples of where hot work permit form usage and administration could be improved and two locations where hot work area signs did not provide the required contact information.
- ORP: Issues were identified during a walkdown regarding certain mission important structures, systems and components (SSCs). The contractor corrected these deficiencies.
- ORP: During this reporting period, two FRs were promoted and three FRs were hired. ORP plans to fill the three FR vacancies.

- PPPO: A Paducah FR identified a condition where technical requirements to seal weld threaded connections on piping containing uranium hexafluoride had not been met. Subsequent investigation identified that the system drawing notes needed clarification to specify the types of threaded connections where seal welding is required. Some threaded connections are designed in to allow future component maintenance and replacement.
- PPPO: A Paducah FR identified degrading combustible material controls and hot work control implementation at the Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride (DUF6) Conversion Facility resulting in significant improvements in controlling hot work in the facility.
- PPPO: A Paducah FR identified that valve labeling at the DUF6 Conversion Facility does not meet legibility requirements provided by the technical specification. The DFU6 Contractor indicated that labeling has been identified as a concern during system turnover activities.
- RL: An FR identified a condition where crane inspections put personnel at great risk for fall and damage to extremities by crushing. Specifically, an individual was noted to be above 10 feet, straddling a crane counter weight and drum mount while holding on to moving wire ropes.
- RL: An FR identified a condition where platforms used in critical lifts of degraded fiberglass reinforced plywood boxes containing TRU waste were significantly degraded and had not been inspected for structural soundness.
- RL: An FR identified inadequate command and control/procedure compliance during a spent nuclear fuel transport container purging activity.
- RL: An FR identified inadequate transportation USQ document screens during the K Basins Closure Project Legacy Fuel Removal Operational Readiness Review.
- RL: An FR identified the following deficiencies associated with fall protection: (a) a lack of fall protection by workers where required; (b) inadequate work packages related to fall protection requirements; (c) inadequate evaluation/documentation of fall protection tie-off points; and (d) inadequate supervision of job requiring fall protection.
- RL: During an Integrated Safety Management Systems (ISMS) review for WTP an FR identified weakness in the Contractor's work control program, barriers used for safety of personnel, and procedures lacking identification and controls of specific hazards.
- RL: FR attrition for this reporting period was two with one transferring to an FR position at the Office of River Protection and one promotion to a staff position for the Chief of Nuclear Safety.
- RL: FRs provided oversight for (but not limited to) the following actions: Waste Sampling and Characterization Facility (WSCF) Radiological Boundary Controls; WSCF Hazardous Energy Controls; Procedure adequacy use and compliance; Work Management; Radiological Controls; and Line Management Assessment for K Basin Fuel processing re-start.
- SR: Assistant Manager for Closure Project (AMCP) FRs conducted a start-up readiness assessment of a newly constructed Biomass Boiler Steam Plant. The plant began supplying steam to the Savannah River National Laboratory on September 15.
- SR: An Assistant Manager for Nuclear Material Stabilization Project (AMNMSP) FR and the SR FR Program Manager participated in an Operation Readiness Review at Brookhaven National Lab.
- SR: An AMNMSP FR oversight of the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) Research Operations Department identified several issues associated with Conduct of Operations, including procedure compliance,

lockout/tagout (LO/TO), labeling, confined space permit administration, and caution tags

- SR: AMNMSP FRs performed oversight of implementation of high activity waste and low activity waste segregation project in H Canyon, including the contractor Readiness Assessment.
- SR: An Assistant Manager for Waste Disposition Project (AMWDP) FR conducted oversight of a contractor Management Assessment for readiness to begin large waste box NDA. As a result of his actions, the contractor suspended their review and corrected significant CONOPS issues.
- SR: AMWDP FRs performed a readiness review prior to initiation of the Tank 5 and Tank 6 Chemical Cleaning activities.
- SR: As part of the readiness process, AMWDP FRs conducted an assessment of the contractor's Readiness Assessment for the Tank 18/19 Mechanical Waste Removal operation.
- SR: Four FR vacancies were filled during this reporting period. Personnel actions are nearing completion to fill the remaining vacancies.
- WVDP: An FR conducted a Maintenance Management Review that identified corrections and improvements to be incorporated in the Maintenance Implementation Plan.
- WVDP: An FR initiated the need for the contractor's added emphasis on hand protection and on monitoring government vehicle damages.
- WVDP: The FR Program was evaluated in a triennial self-assessment and all objectives were scored as adequate for an overall satisfactory score.
- WVDP: The FR vacancy was filled during this reporting period.

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY

Facility Representative Program Performance Indicators (3QCY2008)

<u>Field or Ops Office</u>	<u>Staffing Analysis</u>	<u>FTEs</u>	<u>Actual Staffing</u>	<u>% Staffing</u>	<u>Attrition</u>	<u>% Core Qualified</u>	<u>% Fully Qualified</u>	<u>% Field Time *</u>	<u>% Oversight Time **</u>
ID (NE)	11	11	11	100	0	100	100	49	82
NE Totals	11	11	11	100	0	100	100	49	82
DOE GOALS	-	-	-	100	-	-	>80	>40	>65

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** % Oversight Time includes % Field Time

NE Facility Representative (FR) Highlights:

- ID (NE): An FR for Site Wide Complex (SWC) discovered that contractor informality in its Staffing Level Performance Indicator packaging and transportation implementation had allowed radioactive material to be shipped over a public highway without appropriate documentation in place.
- ID (NE): An FR identified that a critical lift was being performed in violation to the critical lift plan and that one of the items (a special lift fixture) was not analyzed for the manner in which it was being used.
- ID (NE): A SWC FR discovered that contractor procedures and training were insufficient to ensure that the DOE Radiological Assistance Program would be alerted to contractor radiological responses off-site. The FR also discovered that contractor line management had failed to ensure an abnormal event was properly investigated, critiqued, and categorized in a timely manner thus jeopardizing its ability to formulate and implement corrective actions.
- ID (NE): During the CPP-666 Concurrent Fuel Handling Readiness Assessment, an FR identified that the Fuel Prep Stand was not identified as approved storage as part of the Contractor Approved Fuel List (CAFL) and that the CAFL did not adequately implement the Technical Safety Requirement (TSR) Specific Administrative Controls. This resulted in a Pre-Start Finding as it would have resulted in TSR non-compliance.
- ID (NE): FRs at the Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC) identified several deficiencies in the maintenance and control of facility systems. The FRs identified a failure by the contractor to perform post-maintenance testing of a recently repaired steam system prior to releasing the system for service. The FRs also identified numerous boiler system gauges that were out of calibration, and a newly installed piece of equipment in which operational restrictions were identified on the controller with a Post-It note. In all three cases, no additional controls were in place to prevent operation of the equipment or systems.

NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION SITES

Facility Representative Program Performance Indicators (3QCY2008)

<u>Site Office</u>	<u>Staffing Analysis</u>	<u>FTEs</u>	<u>Actual Staffing</u>	<u>% Staffing</u>	<u>Attrition</u>	<u>% Core Qualified</u>	<u>% Fully Qualified</u>	<u>% Field Time *</u>	<u>% Oversight Time **</u>
LASO	14	14	10	71	2	80	60	42	68
LSO	10	10	10	100	0	100	70	40	74
NSO	8	8	9	112	0	78	78	50	69
PXSO	10	10	9	90	0	90	80	45	74
SRSO	4	4	4	100	1	75	50	35	69
SSO	11	11	10	91	1	100	80	38	76
YSO	12	10	10	83	1	100	80	51	71
NNSA Totals	69	67	62	90	5	91	73	44	72
DOE GOALS	-	-	-	100	-	-	>80	>40	>65

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** % Oversight Time includes % Field Time

NNSA Facility Representative (FR) Highlights:

- LASO: One FR was on an extended detail to DOE-HQ and another FR was detailed-out as the Readiness Program Manager. Neither of these FRs are included in the actual staffing. One FR transferred back to the FR program after several years as a Federal Project Director (FPD). Site FR attrition for this reporting period was two as these FRs transferred to other DOE locations.
- LASO: One FR performed numerous Criticality Safety Limit Approval (CSLA) walkdowns verifying mass location criticality safety postings matched associated location CSLAs in support of the TA-55 Augmented Limit Review (ALR) process. The Nuclear Criticality Safety Augmented Limit Review (ALR) was completed at Technical Area 55 (TA-55) on September 16, 2008. All operations within the facility have been returned to service. Many criticality safety limits were modified during the review, resulting in an increased criticality safety margin.
- LASO: One FR served as the POC, facilitator, and team member for a lessons learned, safety basis, and fire protection review of the Idaho National Laboratory's Accelerated Retrieval Project. The information gathered will be highly relevant to MDA B remediation activities.
- LASO: One FR was as a member of the Area-G Remote Drum Venting Readiness Assessment (RA) by serving as the Lead Assessor for the Maintenance and Engineering Functional Areas.
- LASO: Several FRs completed an Accident Investigator Training course.
- LASO: Two FRs performed a follow-up CONOPs Assessment for the DOE Interim Radiography RA.
- LSO: During the contractor's preparation of a large high explosive hoisting and rigging operation, an FR identified that a rigger had not completed all explosives handler training requirements to support this activity.
- LSO: FR oversight activities during this reporting period resulted in identification of 30 procedure related issues.
- LSO: FRs supported the review and subsequent approval of CONOPS applicability matrices for all Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory facilities.
- LSO: Two FRs began verification of TSR implementation at their respective facilities.

- LSO: Two FRs were involved in review and resolution to two Discrepant as Found Conditions and two PISAs in a Category 3 nuclear facility.
- NSO: An FR coordinated and finalized work control improvements at the Nevada Site Office. During the quarter NSO FRs served on an Operational Readiness Review of a recently re-categorized nuclear hazard category III facility.
- NSO: An NNSA Future Leader's Program participant is filling the role of a Facility Representative, thus making staffing levels nine total.
- NSO: FRs continued to maintain qualifications and proficiencies as emergency management drill and exercise controllers and evaluators, assisting the NSO Emergency Management Functional Area Manager and supplementing contractor staff in running complex exercises at Emergency Response venues as needed. During this reporting period, no emergency management exercises were conducted.
- NSO: The FR Group (FRG) continued to implement the continuing training program. FRs are assigned responsibility for providing continuing training topics per an established schedule, and can either develop and present the training themselves or utilize a subject matter expert.
- NSO: The FRG continued with a pilot program, being executed during FY2008, to shadow M&O contractor performed assessments as per DOE-P-226 and the most current DOE-O-226 per the expectations of Field Element Managers for Line Oversight Contractor Assurance System programs. Shadow assessment criteria have been developed based upon DOE-G-414.1-1B
- PXSO: The Assistant Manager for Facility Operations (AMFO) staff supported a review of DSA control flow-down and completed a review of the Procedures and Training DSA Safety Management Program for the Pantex Site during the quarter.
- PXSO: The Site FR vacancy is expected to be filled during the next reporting quarter.
- SRSO: A Senior FR was selected and promoted to Assistant Manager for Mission Assurance.
- SRSO: An NNSA Future Leader Program graduate was assigned to SRSO and is in training to become an FR.
- SRSO: One FR was on detail to the Highly Enriched Uranium Manufacturing Facility at Y-12.
- SSO: An FR assisted a Service Center subject matter expert in the preparation and teaching a three day Future Leaders CONOPS course.
- SSO: An FR pursued inadequacies in the implementation of LO/TO within the contractor's facilities maintenance organization. After a lengthy dispute, the contractor had an assessment of LO/TO performed by an independent organization. The independent assessment confirmed that the two primary issues raised by the FR were valid. Corrective actions are finally being developed to correct a long-standing deficiency in a meeting a basic safety requirement.
- SSO: An SSO FR served as the Acting Executive Officer for the Sandia Site Office.
- SSO: One FR took another position within the Sandia Site Office.
- SSO: Two FRs were team members on the Sandia Site Office Line Management Review of the contractor Sandia Pulsed Reactor Facility/Critical Experiments Restart ORR. The FRs Reviewed conduct of operations, procedures, TSR/DSA/ANS-1-2000 requirements flow down, general conduct of the contractor ORR, and validated completion

of findings.

- YSO: An FR identified an issue where the contractor had performed corrective maintenance work on a safety significant Criticality Accident Alarm System without approved written work instructions. The contractor is evaluating the issue to identify corrective actions.
- YSO: An FR shadowed the B&W investigation of the fire in Building 9720-19. The FR monitored the successful resumption of activities after the issuance of the report and completion of the corrective actions.
- YSO: FRs identified three significant quality process issues associated with the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility (HEUMF) project. These issues included a widespread failure to follow the established system turnover process, inadequate trending and response to on-going equipment protection issues, and incorrect categorization of a reportable occurrence. Corrective actions are pending.
- YSO: Site attrition for this reporting period was one with the FR accepting a lateral position. YSO also has four former FRs on staff maintaining full-FR qualification.

OFFICE OF SCIENCE SITES

Facility Representative Program Performance Indicators (3QCY2008)

<u>Area/Site Office</u>	<u>Staffing Analysis</u>	<u>FTEs</u>	<u>Actual Staffing</u>	<u>% Staffing</u>	<u>Attrition</u>	<u>% Core Qualified</u>	<u>% Fully Qualified</u>	<u>% Field Time *</u>	<u>% Oversight Time **</u>
ASO	5	5	4	80	1	100	100	19	81
BHSO	5	5	5	100	0	100	80	44	82
FSO	2	2	2	100	0	100	100	42	92
OR (SC)	5	5	5	100	0	80	80	41	72
PNSO	4	4	4	100	0	75	75	46	80
SC Totals	21	21	20	95	1	90	85	38	80
DOE GOALS	-	-	-	100	-	-	>80	>40	>65

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** % Oversight Time includes % Field Time

SC Facility Representative (FR) Highlights:

- ASO: One FR was promoted, leaving the Site Office with four FRs. Argonne has not been decided whether the FR position will be filled.
- BHSO: One FR participated in the Oak Ridge Facility Representative Program Assessment and Staffing Analysis.
- BHSO: One FR was temporarily promoted to the BHSO Operations Management Division Director for a 3-month detail.
- FSO: FRs attended the NQA-1 Lead Auditor Training/Certification Course.
- FSO: FRs participated in planning/preparation for the Office of Science Accelerator Safety Workshop.
- FSO: FRs performed several program reviews that included OSHA Injury/Illness Recordkeeping, Technical Shop Safety, Environmental Monitoring, and Emergency Management areas.
- OR(SC): During this reporting period, 113 FR walkthroughs were conducted and documented in the ORION tracking system. Nineteen of these walkthroughs were conducted with ES&H subject matter experts.
- OR(SC): Five assessments were conducted by FRs during this period, covering hoisting and rigging, safety basis implementation, readiness assessment, LO/TO, and DOE 420.2B procedures.
- OR(SC): The Site Office commissioned a self assessment of the FR Program and Staffing Analysis that was begun in July, with the final report delivered to the Site Office in September. The report identified opportunities for improvement, and development of corrective actions in progress.
- PNSO: An FR assisted in reviewing a full draft of the upgraded DSA being prepared for the Radiochemical Processing Lab (RPL).
- PNSO: An FR followed event response and restart actions associated with a 120VAC electrical shock at the RPL during fire alarm system work.
- PNSO: An FR followed the causal analysis for a hazardous energy control occurrence at Process Development Lab

West (PDLW).

- PNSO: An FR followed the completion of construction and startup of the quarter scale model of the Hanford Vitrification Plant pretreatment system in the PDLW.
- PNSO: FRs assisted in qualification efforts of new SSO and FR staff members.
- PNSO: FRs continued monitoring construction and transition activities including the erection of steel and the pouring of concrete for four of the five buildings comprising the Physical Sciences Facility (PSF); the replacement of the fire alarm system in the RPL, and the replacement of the supercomputer and the construction of the fifth cooling tower for the Environmental Molecular Science Lab (EMSL).